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1. Introduction 
1.1 Biorisk, biosafety and biocontainment: A life or death process  
Safety at workplaces, occupational diseases, pandemics, international travel, public 
transportation, day care centers, nursing homes, and jails, among others, are situations we 
are frequently involved in and whose impact and risks we are not aware of but could 
change the course of our lives. When we travel abroad on business or vacation usually our 
expectations are high, but we have no information on the process undertaken to secure 
passengers health, as well as community and environmental safety. When we share a closed 
space such as an airplane, we should be aware of some diseases, especially air borne 
diseases, to be able to assess exposure risk and minimize it by adopting biosafety measures 
(individual, collective or both), and have the proper infrastructure to contain or isolate such 
risk.  
Based on this multifactor approach, scientists and experts on Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
biology, on chemical agents, personal protective equipment (PPE), industrial air purifiers, 
building design, laboratory equipment and different transportation means join their efforts 
to harmonize the life of communities around the planet.  
Every community should make an effort to acquire a culture aimed at preserving their 
physical integrity and environmental quality because this process is not restricted to expert 
laboratories. Anti-pandemic plans presently emphasize that communities are the main pillar 
to contain these devastating events and such a perspective must transcend the usual 
scenarios such as hospitals, laboratories, universities, public transportation, supermarkets, 
movie theaters, etc.  
The debate today is heated, and there is an extensive and sometimes emphatic 
documentation. Many of the aspects involved are described separately, but we must 
remember that they should be integrated so as to avoid implementing isolated components 
that may have been successful elsewhere but are not reproducible in our own settings. The 
present chapter is no exception: we collected the minimum information required to develop 
the safety data sheet and start the risk assessment; we describe the basic, most general 
biosafety measures adopted internationally, and we offer a guide on essential 
biocontainment measures (some of which are described in the section dedicated to 
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biosafety). Such a structure responds solely to academic purposes, but we have to remember 
that in reality they are inclusive, inseparable processes aimed at the same results. They are 
the starting point to strengthen the process in any institution, and, therefore, risk assessment 
should be done together with experts from different disciplines and based on updated 
knowledge, as well as on the identification of protection elements that may be included in 
the process and adapted to specific infrastructures and resources. This is the only way to 
develop a practical and reliable process. Besides, contingency plans should be designed to 
respond to unexpected catastrophic events such as bioterrorist attacks (Wheelis 2002) and 
natural disasters.  
 
Fig. 1. Calculating risk levels and negative and positive impact according to the safety 
procedures. 
Finally, as this is a complex and dynamic process, you should determine a specific, known 
and daily situation and then identify exposure risks, the PPE presently in use and consider 
and assess if you can contain the risk and prevent it from having greater magnitude. Figure 
1 will help you in calculating risk levels and negative and positive impact according to your 
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present procedures. Remember human fragility and the fact that probably many of the 
elements mentioned are no at your disposal, but you can resort to those available in your 
day-to-day scenario. Human beings are not disposable or reusable, but they are 
biodegradable or incinerable depending on the circumstances, and that is why the process 
described in this chapter must be seen as conducive to a better quality of life or to death. 
2. Biorisk 
The following is a description of various characteristics of the microorganism which are 
useful in understanding biorisk, biosafety, and biocontainment. M. tuberculosis is a pathogen 
that has been extensively studied; the majority of information required for risk-evaluation of 
each procedure or work situation can be easily consulted in publications of such renowned 
international organizations as: The World Health Organization (WHO); The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Institutes of Health (NIH); Sandia 
National Laboratories; American Biological Safety Association (ABSA); Asociación Mexica 
de Bioseguridad (AMEXBIO), and in the domestic regulations of each country. The updated 
versions of this information can be accessed through the systematic review of professional 
scientific publications. Each institutional biosafety committee is responsible for 
implementing, and ensuring compliance with, the relevant guidelines and regulations. The 
M. tuberculosis safety data sheet should be prepared in each laboratory, posted in a 
conspicuous location, and accessible to all personnel who work in the area. Staff should be 
diligent in the risk assessment of their tasks and procedures, request the required PPE, and 
comply with containment measures in order to guarantee their safety and that of their 
colleagues and the environment. 
2.1 Safety date sheet 
2.1.1 Identification of the microorganism, (Riley 1961, Kunz 1982, Wayne 1984 and 
Grange 1990) 
Agent name: Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
Taxonomy 
Domain:  Bacteria 
Phylum:  Actinobacteria 
Class: Actinomycetes 
Order: Actinomycetales 
Family: Mycobacteriaceae 
Genus: Mycobacterium 
Specie: tuberculosis 
2.1.2 Biological characteristics 
Condition: bacteria aerobic 
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Grow: slow-growing 
Motility: non-motile 
Spore: non-endospore forming* (aspect in discussion by Ghosh 2009 and Traag 2010)  
Acid-Fast Bacillus (AFB) 
Allergenic: no  
Cancerous: no  
Abortive: no  
Toxins forming: no  
Immunosupressor: no  
Capable of mutating in the host: yes 
Recommended pictogram:  
 
2.1.3 Mode of transmission 
Usually airborne human to human (inhalation of infectious aerosols or infected droplets) or 
dermal inoculation and possible ingestion, it is not transmitted through sexual contact, and 
there has been no documentation of vertical transmission. (Wells 1955 and Verhagen 2011) 
Disease: 
Tuberculosis (TB) (second leading cause of death worldwide)  
Latent TB infection 
Multidrug resistant TB (MDR TB) 
Extensively drug resistant TB (XDR TB) 
Host:  
Humans, nonhuman primates, and commonly used laboratory animals: pigs, cats, dogs, 
sheep, cattle, rodents and seals. Some domestic animals, in contact with people suffering 
from TB, are able to develop TB and become themselves a source of infection. (Grange 1990, 
National Research Council. 1997 and 2003, Hankenson 2003, Krauss 2003, and Cousins 2003)  
Infectious dose for humans: is very low (ID50 1-10 bacilli by inhalation route), a sputum of 
an infected patient can contain several millions of bacilli per milliliter.(Riley, 1957 and 1961 
and CDC 1999) 
Communicability: high, human to human with symptoms. 
Incubation period: long (years), may progress to pulmonary or disseminated disease. 
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Vectors: none 
Zoonosis: by inhalation or direct contact with infected animal or tissues from infected 
animal.  
Survival on inanimate surfaces at different relative humidities: M. tuberculosis can survive 
for several days on inanimate surfaces; 70 days on carpet, 45 days on clothing, 105 days on 
paper, 90 to 120 days on dust, 6 to 8 months in sputum in a cool and dark room, 45 days in 
manure, and 49 days in guinea pig tissue.(Kunz 1982, and Rubin 1991)  
Geographical localization: worldwide 
2.1.4 Detection  
Latent TB infection has been traditionally identified by the tuberculin skin test (TST, 
Mantoux or PPD); currently the new generation of test entails interferon gamma (IFN-γ) 
release assays (IGRAs: Quantiferon and T-SPOT.TB). 
Diagnosis of TB: acid fast stain of sputum samples, culture, phenotypic and genotypic 
identification of M. tuberculosis, DNA fingerprinting (Rozo 2010) and drug susceptibility 
testing and tissue exams. 
Possibility of viewing the bacillus in clinical specimens: yes, through examination of 
clinical sample for acid-fast bacilli (AFB), fluorescence microscopy and light-emitting diode 
(LED) 
Growth in culture media: yes, frequently in Lowenstein-Jensen (LJ), Ogawa Kudoh (OK) or 
liquid culture as modified Middlebrook 7H9 broth, the M. tuberculosis is of slow growth, 
between 4 to 8 weeks, from clinical samples. (Welch 1993) 
Rapid identification of M. tuberculosis: through the employment of methods such as 
nucleic acid hybridization methods, lateral flow assays, line probe assays, and DNA 
sequencing. 
2.1.5 Epidemiology 
Risk population: it is relatively more prevalent in immigrants, minorities, the elderly, 
persons with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) and among healthcare workers, 
and laboratory personnel who are occupationally exposed. 
Mortality and morbidity: mortality for TB, depending on the country, MDR TB 50% to 70% 
of the patients not treated within a period of two years. Mortality is higher in patients with 
TB/AIDS. The morbidity in TB is high. 
Perception of malicious use: low 
2.1.6 Surveys of laboratory-acquired infection and prophylaxis 
Laboratory personnel should undergo an annual PPD or IGRAs, and workers with a 
positive test should be evaluated for active TB; in accidental exposure the laboratory 
personnel should be tested 3 to 6 months after the event and should be offered prophylaxis 
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if is required in TB, but the referenced isoniazid (INH) prophylaxis is not applicable in MDR 
TB. 
Vaccine: Bacille Calmette Guerin (BCG), attenuate live vaccine, with limited protection. 
(Lietman 1999) 
Treatment: therapy with multiple drugs 
First line: INH, rifampin (RIF), pyrazinamide (PZA), ethambutol (EMB), streptomycin (SM). 
Second line: Amikacin, capreomycin, ciprofloxacin, ethionamide, kanamycin, levofloxicin. 
Ofloxacin and para-aminosalicylic acid for MDR TB and XDR TB. 
2.1.7 Prevention and control 
Exposure control-personal protection: PPE such as respiratory protection (fit-tested 
respirators with N-95 rating) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration –OSHA- 2003 
and 2004), hand protection, eye protection, skin and body protection, and hygiene measures. 
Containment:  
Objective: to prevent aerosol exposure or dermal inoculation. 
Biosafety level (BSL) 2 can be used for low-risk procedures, such as making smear and 
diagnosis activities including primary culture of clinical specimens potentially infected by 
bacilli of M. tuberculosis s with PPE. (Welch 1993)(American Thoracic Society 1993) 
BSL-3 can be used for high-risk procedures, such as handling solid and liquid positive 
culture, secondary cultures for diagnostic or research activities, DNA or RNA extraction 
(only in the initial stages of the procedure)(Castro 2009, Warren 2006, and NIH 2002), 
biochemical test, centrifugations, pipetting, mechanical homogenizing, sonication, heating 
or boiling, work with bacteriological loops, preparation and manipulation of frozen sections, 
animal studies, infected clinical specimens and others with PPE. (CDC. 1999 and 2006, and 
Hankenson 2003) 
2.1.8 Disinfection, inactivation and sterilization of M. tuberculosis 
Efficient disinfectants are: 
0.4-5 phenol during 10 minutes 
5% formaldehyde during at least 10 minutes 
1-2% Glutaraldehyde during 30 minutes  
0.2-5% Sodium hypochlorite for one minute 
70-96% Ethyl alcohol during 2 minutes 
3-10% Hydrogen peroxide during 5 minutes 
2-10%, 75ppm Iodophore 
Mix of iodine + iodophores or ethyl alcohol 
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Mix of paraformaldehyde + glutaraldehyde or formalin 
Susceptible to moist heat sterilization at 121°C for 15 minutes at 121 pounds of pressure in 
autoclave. 
Note: quaternary ammoniums inhibit tubercle bacilli but do not kill them. Please check the 
efficacy of each disinfectant in your own laboratory conditions. 
Ultraviolet dosage required: 10.000 µW-s/cm2 at 254 nanometer for 99.9% destruction of 
bacillus. 
2.1.9 Transport information 
WHO classification of infective microorganisms by risk groups (RG): 
RG 3 (high individual risk, low community risk): a pathogen that usually causes serious 
human or animal disease but does not ordinarily spread from one infected individual to 
another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available (WHO 2004). 
Cultures positives for M. tuberculosis require packing measures, and labeled as “Infectious 
substance”. The triple packaging should be utilized according to the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) and Dangerous Goods regulation and WHO 
recommendations. M. tuberculosis (cultures only) is included in Category A, UN 2814 
(Infectious Substances, affecting humans) see table 1. (IATA 2006) 
 
Infections 
substance 
Class Division Category 
Proper 
shipping 
name 
UN 
Number 
Packing 
instruction 
(PI) 
M. 
tuberculosis 
cultures 
only 
6 6.2 A 
Infections 
substance 
2814 602 
Table 1. General information of M. tuberculosis for international shipping. 
2.1.10 Biosafety functions officer  
Mistakes and accidents, which result in over-exposure to infectious materials, should be 
immediately reported and corrective measures should be taken to avoid a repetition of the 
event. 
Mandatory: personnel concerned with mycobacteria activity should be experienced and 
under the supervision of the head of the laboratory. 
2.2 Epidemiology of hospital and laboratory acquired TB 
The epidemiology is defined as the study of the distribution and determinants of diseases 
and injuries in human populations. Inherent in the definition of epidemiology is the 
necessity of measuring the amount of disease in a population by relating the number of 
cases to a population base. One of the unfortunate consequences of working with infectious 
materials is the potential for acquiring an infection. The laboratory acquired infections (LAI) 
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due to a wide variety of viruses, bacteria, parasites and fungi have been described. In the 
absence of precise data on LAIs, epidemiological methods provide the necessary tools to 
evaluate the extent and nature of personnel exposures. Although the precise risk of infection 
after an exposure remains poorly defined, surveys of LAIs suggested that Brucella species, 
Shigella species, Salmonella species, M. tuberculosis and Neisseria meningitidis are the most 
common causes. Early surveys of laboratory acquired TB found an incidence of TB among 
laboratory personnel 3-9 times greater than that in the general population (Harrintong 1976 
and Reid 1957). The M. tuberculosis, the causative organism of TB, has distinction of 
repeatedly being ranked within the top five most commonly LAI (Pike 1976, 1978, and 1979). 
The OSHA in 1996, 1997, 2003 and 2004, promulgated withdrawal of the 1997 proposed 
standard on occupational exposure to TB. Along with the withdrawal of the 1997 standard, 
the respirator-specific standard, 29 CFR 1910.139, was also withdraw. The effect of 
withdrawing these standards is the application of the general industry respiratory 
protection standard, 29 CFR 1910.134, for all occupations, to those workplaces that provide 
respiratory protection from TB. 
According to WHO, TB remains the second leading cause of death worldwide, killing 2 
million people each year. In many developed countries, TB is considered a disease of the 
past. However, the impact of this disease can be devastating even today specially in poor 
countries. An estimated 9.4 million new cases of TB globally, with most cases occurring in 
resource limited or resource poor countries. In addition to that, much of deadliness of TB 
epidemic has to do with the virulent synergy between Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV) and TB. Recently, MDR-TB and XDR TB have had devastating effects on populations 
of HIV infected individuals in developing countries.  
2.3 Risk assessment  
Risk assessment was defined by Boa (Boa 2000), as “the use of factual information to define 
the health effects of exposure to individuals or populations to hazardous materials and 
situations“ 
The CDC and the NIH provided the basic definition for risk in their Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories: -“Risk” implies the probability that harm, injury, 
or disease will occur. In the environment of the research, microbiological, teaching, and 
biomedical laboratories, the assessment of risk focuses first and foremost on the prevention 
of laboratory associated infections and the likelihood that the agent can be used as a weapon 
and the consequences of bioattack with the agent. The risk assessment helps to assign the 
BSL, PPE required, laboratory and facilities design, equipment that can be used, procedures 
and practices that can be implemented and that reduce, to a minimum, the personnel and 
the environmental risk of exposure to an agent. The risk evaluation should be made by the 
person with the best knowledge of the microorganism (M. tuberculosis) and the available 
containment measures. The risk assessment can be quantitative in the presence of known 
hazards or qualitative when the data will be incomplete or unknown. 
The CDC and NIH recommend that the laboratory director or principal investigator, in close 
collaboration with the institutional biosafety committee, be responsible for assessing risk in 
order to set the BSL for the work. 
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The risk assessments should be conducted periodically and the analysis should include: new 
variables; updated information and procedures related to M. tuberculosis; management of 
the TB; MDR TB or XDR TB, and new international regulations applicable to the malicious 
use of the bacillus or bacillus-infected substances.  
The CDC and NIH include the following important factors in a risk assessment: 
1. The pathogenicity of the infectious or suspected infectious agent, in this case M. 
tuberculosis, including disease incidence and severity (morbidity and mortality). 
Remark: The more severe the potentially acquired disease, the higher the risk. With 
respect to M. tuberculosis, one has to consider the types of resistance (TB, MDR TB, and 
XDR TB). 
2. The route of transmission (parenteral, airborne or ingestion). Remark: The greater the 
aerosol potential, the higher the risk (for M. tuberculosis the mode of transmission is 
usually airborne). 
3. Agent stability: aerosol infectivity and the agent´s ability to survive over time in the 
environment. Factors such as desiccation, exposure to sunlight or ultraviolet light, or 
exposure to chemical disinfectants must be considered. 
4. The infectious dose of M. tuberculosis. 
5. The concentration (number of infectious organisms per unit volume). 
6. The origin of the potentially infectious materials. 
7. The availability of data from animal studies, in the absence of human data. 
8. The established availability of an effective prophylaxis or therapeutic interventions. 
9. Medical surveillance. 
10. Evaluation of the experience and skill level of at-risk personnel. 
Sandia National Laboratories International Biological Threat Reduction department worked 
with biosafety, infectious disease, and risk experts to develop a systematic and standardized 
methodology for biological safety risk assessments. This standardized methodology will 
enhance biosafety risk assessments by allowing them to be both repeatable and quantifiable. 
This methodology is not intended as an all-hazards assessment, but is focused on the risks 
associated with biological materials being handled in a laboratory setting. Sandia National 
Laboratories defined criteria related to: 
- Agent factors which impact the biosafety risk to humans,  
- Agent factors which impact the biosafety risk to animals,  
- Procedures used for the activity being assessed, procedures and processes involving 
animals used for the procedure being assessed. 
A “scoring system” was developed for each criterion, with zero defined as the absence of the 
element defined by the criterion and four defined as the highest possible value for the 
element (for some elements the highest possible value is the worst case and for others the 
highest possible value is the best case). For example: 
Is this agent known to cause infection via inhalation in humans (to cause infection via 
droplets or droplet nuclei that have entered the upper or lower respiratory tract) in a 
laboratory setting? 
4=Preferred route 
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2= A possible route 
1=Unknown 
0=Not a route 
Taking the via inhalation in humans scenario for an agent which cannot cause infection via 
inhalation the score will be zero; for an agent which via inhalation as M. tuberculosis is the 
preferred route of infection the score will be four.  
The biosafety risk assessment model has been coded into a software package which runs on 
Microsoft’sc .Net Framework. The software, titled “BioRAMSoftware.exe” (Version 1.0 
dated September 2010), was planned to be released open source and discussions have 
started to freely license the software to organizations. The BioRAMSoftware allows visitors 
to provide the scores for all the criteria in a simple tool by answering a set of questions. The 
BioRAMSoftware calculates the risk scores using the algorithms and weights defined in the 
model and methodology. The BioRAMSoftware also allows visitors to modify the wording 
of questions and the definitions of the scoring scales to better reflect a unique laboratory 
situation or language differences. The software then produces a numeric and graphical 
document with the relative risk rankings for the visitors and a chart identifying the impact 
each question had on the final results. This feature is useful in understanding and 
communicating the risks, as well as providing guidance on risk management or mitigation 
efforts. Also, visitors can view and, if needed, modify the weights. The methodology 
outlined is consistent with internationally accepted risk assessment schemes and also 
parallels international biosafety risk assessment guidance.  
Biosafety RAM includes generalized definitions of how to conduct a biosafety risk 
assessment: 
Evaluate the biological agents that exist at the facility. 
Evaluate the facility processes and procedures. 
Evaluate the existing biorisk mitigation measures. 
You can establish the procedures and concrete situations based upon your institution’s 
particular environment, geographical conditions, and risk assessment. The BioRAMSoftw is 
available on: http://www.sandia.gov/  
The selection should include all situations and procedures that represent a risk for 
employees, the community, the natural environment, and animals. Biosafety and 
biocontainment measures should then be implemented based upon each institution’s 
particular situation. A risk assessment should be initiated that defines the specific problem. 
The method of risk assessment should be simple; easy to apply and interpret; and should 
permit a quantitative classification of risk on a scale ranging from very low, low, moderate, 
high, and very high risk.  
A risk assessment should include the characteristics of M. tuberculosis that are described in 
the safety data sheet. The intrinsic properties and the laboratory techniques that are likely to 
generate infectious aerosols should be evaluated based upon each particular situation. For 
example, in a research laboratory one should establish the difference between the 
characteristics of bacteria’s under study; the H37Ra (ATCC 25177) used in some experiments 
is classified as a RG 2 pathogen, while the H37Rv (ATCC 2618) strain is designated as RG 3 
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pathogen. The information collected in the risk assessment may confirm changes in the 
pathogenicity of the specific microorganism and, therefore, the risk assessment may be 
altered enough to require an increase in the BSL and PPE for its containment. For example, 
bacteria which have developed resistance to multiple therapeutic drugs, such as M. 
tuberculosis MDR or XDR are considered to be a higher risk due to the lack of treatment 
alternatives and are to be handled with more stringent precautions. This bacteria is RG 3, 
but the extra precautions required for safe work with M. tuberculosis MDR would not be 
expected to take it to a higher containment level than BSL 3. 
The laboratory diagnosis of TB should determine the percentage of positivity of pathogenic 
mycobacteria of clinical specimens submitted for the M. tuberculosis test; reported studies 
estimate that only 1% is positive; however, this data will obviously vary according to region 
and the number of samples that each laboratory processes. Additionally, the following 
factors are of crucial relevance in the risk assessment: 
- M. tuberculosis can be isolated from virtually any type of human or animal specimens. 
- The infectious dose in humans is very low and some samples processed in a diagnostic 
laboratory, such as the sputum of an infected patient, can contain several millions of 
bacilli per milliliter. 
- The infection predominantly occurs by inhalation of airborne bacilli and the 
manipulation of liquid clinical specimens that likely involves generation of infectious 
aerosols, although percutaneous injury or infection by secondary transmission through 
the use of contaminated PPE or laboratory surfaces may also result in infection (Miller 
1987, and Muller 1988). 
Studies of air transmission of TB conducted during the first half of the last century by Wells 
(Wells 1955), led to the framing of the concept of the “droplet nucleus.” The great majority 
of laboratory technicians generate droplets of liquid or aerosols and each droplet may 
contain one or more bacillus. The aerosols that are produced can be classified according 
their size: 
Droplet nuclei: with a size ranging from 1 to 10 µm in diameter and a velocity of 
propagation of 0.2 to 18 cm/minute or 0.1 to 1 µm in diameter and a velocity of propagation 
of 0.005 to 0.2 cm/minute.  
Dust: with a size ranging from 10 to 100 µm in diameter and a velocity of propagation of 18 
to 1800 cm/minute.  
Droplet: with a size ranging from 100 to 400 µm in diameter and a velocity of propagation of 
1800 to 15200 cm/minute. These particles containing M. tuberculosis can remain airborne 
from minutes to hours.  
Larger droplets would not dry and could rapidly contaminate laboratory equipment and 
surfaces, and fingers or gloves, resulting in a secondary contamination of mouth and nasal 
cavities. The droplets settle very slowly and dry, and they are transformed into droplet 
nuclei. These droplet nuclei float in the air of a room and are spread by very small air 
currents; when inhaled they can settle in alveolar spaces and infect the employee.  
Remark: among the laboratory techniques used for the identification and characterization of 
M. tuberculosis, the following ones are likely to increase the risk of contamination or to 
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generate infectious aerosols producing droplet nuclei, such as: centrifugations, pipetting, 
mechanical homogenizing, sonication, heating, boiling, work with bacteriological loops, 
preparation and manipulation of frozen sections, handling of containers with clinical 
specimens, acid-fast staining, manipulation of solid and liquid cultures, flow cytometry, and 
animal studies.  
The risk assessment should also be conducted in hospitals, healthcare units, respiratory 
isolation areas, ambulatory assistance spaces, and for the TB or non- TB patients transiting 
through the institution. 
3. Biosafety 
Biosafety currently involves a large, interdisciplinary group of professionals gathered 
with the unique objective of guaranteeing that the risk of contracting infection for 
employees of the institution, and animals, is reduced to a minimum, and that the 
environment is protected. Currently, however, many of the decisions implemented to 
reduce biorisk, and contain infectious agents, are also employed by the community-at-
large as part of anti-pandemic programs. These activities are dynamic and are 
strengthened by recent scientific and industrial advances. Changes in the biological 
characteristics of microorganisms, and the pace of modern life, have generated host-
parasite relations that facilitate the transmission of illnesses that are devastating for 
humanity. Thanks to the groups engaged in interdisciplinary, scientific work, many of 
these unusual relationships have been disclosed. General and basic recommendations, of a 
compulsory nature, to ensure biosecurity in the manipulation and containment of M. 
tuberculosis, are discussed below.  
WHO classifies microorganisms within four RGs according to infectious characteristics, 
availability of treatment, preventive measures, and the possibility of containing 
dissemination (WHO 2004): 
RG 1: no or low individual and community risk  
RG 2: moderate individual risk, low community risk 
RG 3: high individual risk, low community risk 
RG 4: high individual and community risk  
Current classifications, similar to those created by WHO, have been developed by other 
institutions, such as: Standars Australia/New Zealand 2002, Canadian Laboratory Biosafety 
Guidelines (Laboratory Centre for Disease Control 1996), European Economic Community 
Directive (Comission of the European Communities 2000), NIH Recombinant DNA 
guidelines, and CDC/NIH guidelines (NIH 2002).  
M. tuberculosis is located within these classifications as a microorganism RG3; therefore, its 
management requires the implementation of PPE consistent with its biological 
characteristics; a level of security in facilities and laboratory equipment that will minimize 
the risk of infection and maximize the capability of containment; and measures focused on 
preventing the intentional, malicious use of this microorganism by the institution’s staff or 
outside parties. 
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The WHO’s Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed., 2004, which addresses the general principles 
of biosecurity, establishes the recommended BSLs for the management of microorganisms 
according to their RG, offers examples of laboratory practices that should be frequently 
conducted, and the requisite safety equipment. The BSL designations are based on a 
combination of the containment facilities; design features, equipment, construction, 
practices and operational procedures required for working with agents belonging to the 
various RGs. The laboratory facilities are designated as: 
- BSL 1 – basic laboratory: for microorganisms in RG 1; an example of a facility would be 
a basic teaching laboratory; requirements include a good microbiological technique, 
open bench work, and an autoclave for sterilization of material. The use of PPE is 
recommended in all procedures; however, safety equipment such as a biological safety 
cabinet (BSC) is not required.  
- BSL 2 - basic laboratory: for microorganisms in RG 2; examples of laboratories are 
primary health services, primary level hospitals, diagnostic, teaching and public health. 
Require an implementation of good microbiological technique plus PPE in all 
procedures; biohazard signs, open benches or ventilation (inward air flow or 
mechanical via building system) plus BSC for the potential aerosols and autoclave. 
Various procedures related to the identification of M. tuberculosis through clinical 
samples are conducted at this BSL; therefore, specific PPE measures are obligatory in 
order to minimize the risk of infection. The following are some accepted procedures for 
the identification of M. tuberculosis through clinical samples: 
- Making smear microscopy and diagnostic activities including primary culture of 
clinical specimens potentially infected by bacilli of M. tuberculosis. (Welch 1993) 
- Extraction of DNA, RNA, proteins, cell compounds, and molecular methodologies, 
following the inactivation, death, and lysis of the microorganism; and, having 
previously determined that the experimental protocol for the extraction and separation 
of the bacterial components is completely secure in the particular laboratory conditions 
in which it is conducted (Burgos 2004, Castro 2009 and Warren 2006).  
- BSL 3 – laboratory with containment conditions for microorganisms in RG3; examples 
of laboratories are special diagnostic, production facilities, national tuberculosis 
reference laboratory and research laboratories; all of the conditions that apply for BSL 2 
are included, plus specific PPE, controlled access with double-door entry, isolation 
laboratory, room sealable for decontamination, directional air flow, ventilation (inward 
air flow, mechanical via building system and filtered air exhaust), safety equipment as 
BSC class II or III and autoclave, preferably double –ended. Positive, viable samples of 
M. tuberculosis, M. tuberculosis MDR, and M. tuberculosis XDR should be handled at this 
BSL (Sessler 1983), including the following activities: 
- Handling solid and liquid positive culture  
- Secondary cultures for diagnostic or research activities 
- DNA or RNA extraction (initial step of each protocol) 
- Biochemical test for M. tuberculosis identification 
- Bacterial suspension preparation 
- Detection drugs resistance  
- Centrifugations  
- Pipetting 
- Mechanical homogenizing 
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- Sonication, heating or boiling 
- Work with bacteriological loops  
- Preparation and manipulation of frozen sections (biopsies) 
- Animal studies 
- Infected clinical specimens and others  
BSL 4 – laboratory with maximum containment: for microorganisms in RG 4; this is the 
maximum containment-BSL and includes all of the requirements of BSL 3 plus airlock entry, 
airlock with shower, effluent treatment, BSC class III, shower exit, and special waste 
disposal. 
Remark: although some of the precautions may appear to be unnecessary for some 
organisms, and no clinical or hospital laboratory has complete control over the specimens it 
receives, the staff may occasionally and unexpectedly be exposed to organisms in higher 
RGs; therefore, each employee is responsible for his/her own safety; this implies the 
obligatory and continuous use of PPE, and biosecurity and biocontainment measures, 
equipment and facilities while in areas of biological risk.  
General considerations to guarantee biosecurity in each of the established levels are 
provided in the recommendations issued by WHO, CDC, NIH (American Thoracic Society 
1983, Kent 1985, and CDC 1999 WHO 2004). Compliance with these measures should be part 
of a culture of biosecurity and professional responsibility. We consider it important to stress 
some of the following, specific measures for the handling of potentially contaminated 
material, or material infected with M. tuberculosis, in accordance with the requisite level of 
biosecurity: 
BSL 2: 
- The international biohazard sign should be displayed on the doors of rooms where the 
clinical specimens for the search of M. tuberculosis are being processed.  
- The laboratory personnel have specific training in handling agents such as M. 
tuberculosis and are directed by a competent scientist. 
- Access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted. 
- Extreme precautions are taken with contaminated sharp items. 
- The procedure in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted 
in CBS (remember that the risk of aerosols possibly infected with M. tuberculosis in a 
clinical sample such as sputum, or a biopsy, vary according to the number of cases in 
a region and the number of samples processed by a laboratory; therefore, procedures 
including making smear microscopy should be conducted in a color booth with 
biological containment and specific filters for the retention of chemical vapors 
emitted during the coloration process) and additionally, films and smears for 
microscopy should be handled with forceps, stored appropriately, and sterilized 
before disposal.  
- Persons wash their hands after they handle viable materials, after removing gloves, and 
before leaving the laboratory. 
- Eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses, and applying cosmetics are not 
permitted in the work areas. 
- All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of splashes or 
aerosols. 
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- The work surfaces are decontaminated on completion of work or at the end of the day 
and after any spill or splash of viable material with disinfectants that are effective 
against M. tuberculosis.  
- The wastes are decontaminated before disposal by an approved decontamination 
against M. tuberculosis.  
- An insect and rodent control program is in effect. 
Recommendations for special procedures: 
- Access to the laboratory is restricted by the laboratory director when the work with 
M. tuberculosis includes possibly infectious substances. Remark: persons who are at 
increased risk of acquiring infection, or for whom infection may have serious 
consequences, are not permitted in the laboratory. Every person, upon initiating 
employment, should have a medical exam and laboratory tests in order to confirm 
that he/she is not at risk. Each institution should establish requirements to guarantee 
that all staff members are clinically suited for this type of work; this process should 
be conducted in coordination with occupational health professionals, health insurers, 
and experts in risk assessment and biosafety. In some countries, such as Colombia, 
vaccination with BCG is indicated; in those nations that have imposed this 
requirement, the employer should request the appropriate certificate to document the 
vaccination. 
- A degree of precaution must always be taken with any contaminated sharp items, 
including needles and syringes, slides, pipettes, capillary tubes and scalpels. These 
items should be used only when absolutely necessary and should be discarded in 
appropriate containers for subsequent decontamination, thereby preventing the 
formation of aerosols. 
- Spills and accidents that result in over-exposure to substances possibly infected with M. 
tuberculosis are immediately reported to the chief. Medical evaluation and surveillance, 
and prophylaxis or treatment, should be provided based upon the severity of the 
accident and estimated risk of the procedure that was being conducted. Each institution 
should implement protocols for biorisk containment in order to maintain biosecurity; 
all personnel (housekeeping, professional, administrative, students, and others 
authorized to enter work areas) should be familiar with these policies. All laboratory 
areas should include a containment kit that facilitates the rapid implementation of 
corrective measures following an accident, including an appropriate disinfectant for 
laboratory surfaces and equipment, PPE, absorbent paper, tweezers for removal of glass 
particles, and signs to restrict access to the area where the accident occurred. The 
accident response should conclude with an analysis of causes and implementation of 
corrective measures. 
BSL 3: 
All general guidelines governing standard microbiological practices are applicable, in 
addition to the measures included in BSLs 1 and 2. 
- The two person rule should apply, whereby no individual ever works alone in the 
laboratory. 
- All procedures involving the M. tuberculosis manipulation are conducted within  
BSC. 
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- The laboratory has special engineering design features; however, in the case of those 
laboratories that do not possess all of these features, good ventilation, illumination, and 
disinfection of surfaces should be employed in order to guarantee good biosafety. 
Access to the laboratory is restricted, utilize standard microbiological practices. The 
decision to implement this modification of BSL 3 recommendations should be made 
only by the laboratory director. 
- The laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments are in progress. 
- The laboratory personnel receive the appropriate immunizations with BCG Vaccine or 
test for the infection surveillance with M. tuberculosis, TST or IGRAs. 
- The biosafety manual specific to the laboratory is prepared or adopted by the 
laboratory director and biosafety precautions are incorporated into standard 
operating procedures.  
- The laboratory and support personnel receive specific training about the potential 
hazards associated with M. tuberculosis. 
- The laboratory director is responsible for ensuring that before working with M. 
tuberculosis, all workers demonstrate proficiency in standard microbiological practices 
and experience in handling M. tuberculosis. 
The CDC and NIH, besides providing orientation about standard microbiological practices 
and special practices for each BSL, also describe the safety equipment or primary barriers 
and the laboratory facilities or secondary barriers (CDC 2000). In the following section we 
reproduce some of these recommendations and include information pertaining to the 
handling of M. tuberculosis: 
Safety equipment or primary barriers for BSL 2 
- All procedures should be conducted in BSC class II; the selection of BSC should be 
based upon the actual conditions of each laboratory as reflected in the risk assessment; 
all BSC’s should include at least one HEPA (high efficiency particulated air) filter with 
at least 99.97% efficiency in retaining particles of 0.3 micrometers, protecting both the 
operator and the environment; various types may also provide greater protection for 
the product.  
BSC class II type A1: 
- Re-circulates 70% and removes 30% to the interior of the laboratory 
- Minimum inflow 75 fpm 
- Gas jets, volatile toxic chemicals, and radionucleotides cannot be used 
- Includes a front aperture and guillotine-type window 
BSC class II type A2: 
- Re-circulates 70% and removes 30% to the interior of the laboratory 
- Minimum inflow 100 fpm 
- Gas jets, volatile toxic chemicals, and radionucleotides cannot be used 
- Includes a front aperture and guillotine-type window 
- Installation of a tube can allow 30% of the air to be ventilated to the exterior of the lab; 
traces of radionucleotides and small quantities of volatile, toxic liquids can be used 
The two types of BSC class II can be used in BSLs 1, 2, and 3 (National Sanitation 
Foundation International -NSF- 2002). 
www.intechopen.com
 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis: Biorisk, Biosafety and Biocontainment 
 
219 
- The centrifugation of specimens should be done in closed containers, i.e., centrifuge 
safety cups; these containers are opened only in BSC class II.  
- Protective elements such as goggles, mask, and face shield, should be used in order to 
prevent splashes or sprays of material possibly contaminated with M. tuberculosis or 
other infectious substances. These measures should be used continuously while 
working, preferably when BSC protection is not available. 
- Clothing appropriate for the laboratory should be used, such as impermeable uniforms, 
gowns that close at the back, caps, shoe protectors, and other items that the institution 
may consider to be necessary. Laboratory clothing should be used only in the 
laboratory and is not permitted in other areas such as cafeterias, bathrooms, libraries, 
on public transportation, offices, etc.  
Remark: “all protective clothing is either disposed of in the laboratory or laundered by the 
institution; it should never be taken home by personnel.” 
- When working with contaminated material, on contaminated surfaces or equipment, it 
is recommended that two pairs of gloves be used. Every laboratory should establish a 
protocol for the disinfection of gloves and hand washing upon completing work. 
The laboratory facilities or secondary barriers for BSL 2: 
- Laboratory installations should be isolated from public areas, when possible 
- Hand-washing and eyewash should be available 
- Laboratory facilities, furniture and chairs, should be easy to clean and disinfect; avoid 
the use of carpets and rugs. 
- The laboratory should not be accessible to unauthorized persons. 
Safety equipment or primary barriers for BSL 3 
- All PPE specific for the manipulation of M. tuberculosis should be used, including: 
caps, shoe protectors, impermeable clothing, and gowns that close in the back. These 
elements should be disinfected prior to leaving BSL 3 for the laundry or to be 
discarded. 
- Frequent change of gloves and hand washing is recommended. Disposable gloves are 
not reused. Respiratory and face protection are used when handling or monitoring 
infected animals. 
- In the case of M. tuberculosis, infected material is handled in BSC class II; the possibility 
of using BSC class II type B should be considered based upon the characteristics and 
risk assessment of each laboratory.  
BSC class II type B1: 
Re-circulates 40% and removes 60% to the exterior of the laboratory 
Minimum inflow 100 fpm 
Permits traces of radionucleotides and small quantities of volatile, toxic chemicals; the use of 
gas burners is not recommended. 
BSC class II type B2: 
Re-circulates 0% and removes 100% to the exterior of the laboratory 
Minimum inflow 100 fpm 
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Recommended for the handling of radionucleotides and volatile, toxic chemicals; the use of 
gas burners is not recommended. 
Remark: each laboratory should develop its own protocols for the use and disinfection of 
BSC, according to the instructions of the manufacturer, frequency of use, and risk 
assessment. The decision to use a BSC class III should be based upon the risk assessment of 
each laboratory. 
Some PPE serve an important function, especially given the current, particular situation 
concerning M. tuberculosis. The short-term prospects of obtaining a vaccine or new, 
alternative methods of treatment are remote, and the evolving strain of M. tuberculosis that is 
resistant to various, contemporary therapies dictate effective methods of personal 
protection. Presently, individual respiratory protection is the most recommended measure, 
and not only for laboratory staff; these devices should also be used by hospital personnel 
(physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, and administrative personnel who attend 
patients, among others); additionally, it is necessary to remark upon the differences between 
respirators and surgical masks (American National Standard Institute 1992, CDC 1994). The 
surgical masks provide protection against pathogens present in droplets emitted by 
coughing; protection is limited to the nose and mouth as the mask does not completely 
cover the face; therefore, masks do not provide protection against infection contained in 
droplet nuclei. These masks are now recommended for use by TB patients as they move 
throughout the hospital or when they are within confined spaces. Respirators, on the other 
hand, are designed to provide protection against pathogenic microorganisms contained in 
droplet nuclei; these can include respirators for the retention of particulates or the 
purification of air. Respirators that purify air function with batteries that power a ventilator 
providing filtered air to the user; this protective item can be disinfected, allows the change 
of HEPA filters, and guarantees a level of 100% purification of air. A particulate respirator 
can be reusable and employ filters that are easily replaced; the equipment can be disinfected 
and permits installation of a new filter. These respirators do not prevent transmission when 
used by infected persons. Disposable face respirators are made of filtered material that 
impedes the passage of large and small particles contained in the air; some include a valve 
for expelling air. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health –NIOSH- 2003 
and 2004) has approved nine types of respirators for the retention of particulates. 
Differences include capacity to filter air, and resistance of the filter to oil (partially or 
strongly resistant). See table 2. Any of these can be used when handling M. tuberculosis. 
General characteristics of respirators
Class of respirators Resistance to oils % of retention 
R 
95 Resistant 95
99 Resistant 99
100 Resistant 99.97 
P 
95 Partial 95
99 Partial 99
100 Partial 99.97 
N 
95 No 95
99 No 99
100 No 99.97 
Table 2. General characteristics of respirator. 
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Correct training in the use and care of these items is indispensable in order to guarantee 
their protective function; the respirators should be properly adjusted to the face; the 
perception of odors or the presence of air leaks is an indication that the respirator is not 
functioning properly. Remark: These elements are for individual use and should be 
discarded when alterations, stains, porosity, or humidity are present.  
The laboratory facilities or secondary barriers for BSL 3: 
- All doors and windows should remain closed. 
- A double-door system should be in place that does not allow both doors to be open at 
the same time (an alarm should sound if this occurs). 
- A special ventilation system with HEPA filters and negative pressure should be 
installed.  
- All procedures should be conducted in BSC. 
- Autoclaves, preferably double-ended, should be on-site, in the laboratory room. 
- A constant supply of electricity, water, disposal, and gas should be guaranteed; filters 
and other necessary items should be available in order to ensure the containment of M. 
tuberculosis and other pathogens. 
- All necessary equipment should be available in order to conduct all processes and 
avoid the entrance and exit of material that should be contained. 
- All procedures that occur at this BLS should be documented and approved by the 
laboratory director and the institution’s biosafety committee, who should then monitor 
compliance with the policies.  
- Illumination should be adequate and should avoid reflections on cabinet windows and 
on other materials that would impair the vision of the operator. 
- Installations and integrated systems at this BSL should be monitored and inspected 
periodically. 
- Work areas should include decontamination systems and an adequate waste-disposal 
program (a company should be employed that specializes in this area). 
- Equipment should be located in such a manner that facilitates disinfection below and 
between the items. 
- Equipment and work surfaces should be resistant to the action of disinfectants.  
- Professionals are now available who specialize in the planning, construction, and 
maintenance of laboratories at BSL 3; they should be consulted and evaluated by the 
biosafety committee of each institution. 
3.1 Biosafety and hospital control 
Hospital patient care areas, waiting rooms, healthcare units, respiratory isolation areas, 
and TB patients transiting through the institution, are just some examples of areas that 
require PPE for workers personnel and the requisite BSL in order to minimize the risk  
of exposure (CDC 1996). The implementation of biosafety and biocontainment measures 
in the hospital should begin with the creation of a TB control committee responsible for 
risk assessment (CDC 2003). The committee should be responsible for the following 
functions: 
- Comprised of professionals who are expert in the area of biological changes of M. 
tuberculosis and its forms of resistance. 
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- The risk area should be identified 
- Provide preventive measures and guidelines for patient isolation; identify, intervene 
and monitor the transmission risk areas 
- Develop protocols for the management of patients, accidents in areas of risk, anti-
pandemic plans, and for other situations that may arise 
- supervise the compliance with protocols and guidelines 
The areas that comprise the greatest risk of transmission in a hospital, and over which the 
TB control committee should focus its attention, are: ambulatory waiting rooms; radiology 
room; broncoscopy and sputum induction rooms; respiratory isolation rooms; ventilator 
assistance areas; emergency room; autopsy room; and microbiology or micobacteria 
laboratories. A detailed analysis indicates that these areas comprise almost 70% of the 
services provided by a general hospital; therefore, the activities of the TB control committee 
should be continuous and rigorous.  
One of the effective measures used to diminish the transmission of MDR TB and XDR TB in 
the community is the placement of the patient in a respiratory isolation room; the room 
should have HEPA filters for the recirculation of air with a minimum replacement of six air 
changes per hour. The room should have negative pressure, guarantee the privacy of the 
patient, permit effective disinfection measures, and preferably contain an anteroom in order 
to minimize escape risk.  
The TB control committee should delegate authority to a designated professional to decide 
which ambulatory or hospitalized patients should be located within the isolation area. The 
patient should receive clear instructions regarding behavior while in the respiratory 
isolation area (Garner 1996). For example, the patient should cover his/her mouth and nose 
when coughing in the room; upon leaving the room, the patient should cover his/her mouth 
and nose with a surgical mask. Healthcare personnel should avoid, to the maximum extent 
possible, entering the isolation area (Chen 1994). A small number of professionals should 
care for the patient and, when doing so, utilize a special mask such as N95, or respirators. 
Remark: the TB control committee should monitor areas where patients gather, and should 
prepare guidelines to ensure that patients with suspected respiratory illness, pediatric 
patients, infectious persons, and geriatric patients are not in the same waiting room. 
The TB control committee should also develop guidelines for ambulatory care areas that 
provide for adequate ventilation, illumination, and periodic disinfection with effective 
chemical agents against the pathogens most frequently encountered in this area. Air 
conditioners and ventilators are permitted only when used in conjunction with HEPA air 
filtration systems (American Institute of Architects 2001). The assistance room should 
include a ventilator that maintains a barrier between the physician and patient. Air flow 
should be directed toward the air that enters through doors and windows. See figure 2. 
3.2 Biosafety in the teaching laboratory 
The teaching laboratories are usually found in academic institutions to provide a venue for 
instructing students on how sciences are conducted and for training in specific applications. 
This laboratory in all discipline is unique in at least one important aspect. As a general rule 
and particularly at introductory levels, teaching laboratories tend to be densely populated 
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Fig. 2. Basic biosafety recommendations at the healthcare units. 
On http://www.who.int/docstore/gtb/publications/healthcare/index.htm the WHO has 
proposed practical and low cost interventions to reduce nosocomial transmission.  
with large numbers of individuals with limited experience in hazard of a science laboratory 
and certain number of then may be immunocompromised. Please answer the question ¿Are 
teaching laboratories less safe than others laboratories? The correct answer is no, because in 
this space de student must to learn the specific topics for risk assessment, biosafety and 
biocontainment. Is a responsibility of educational institutions to teach about of biosafety 
with the international and national guidelines and the use of PPE. (WHO 1992, CDC 1999, 
2002, and 2005, Food and Drug Administration 2004). 
3.3 Biosafety in the pharmaceutical industry 
The microorganisms used in pharmaceutical companies are extremely diverse, 
encompassing bacteria, viruses, fungi, helminthes and protozoa. The pharmaceutical 
companies that use pathogenic microorganisms to produce or testing drugs, and vaccine 
must establish a broad range of biosafety practice to ensure the safety of their workers 
and their product. During the scale up, the biosafety practices employed should be in 
harmony with the international guidelines to ensure that the manufacturing process and 
product may be used and sold internationally. The biosafety in the pharmaceutical 
encompasses both laboratory scale practices and requires a well organized and 
implemented program of risk assessment, risk management, program evaluation and 
modification (Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens 1998). More information: 
CDC 1997 and http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/eudralex/vol-4/pdfs-en/anx02en200408.pdf  
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4. Biocontainment 
The biocontainment measures are very important, they arise from an adequate handling that 
an institution must do of their risk assessment, biological level, procedures, biosecurity 
measures, PPE, standards and protocols in order to prevent malicious use. The 
implementation and strict adherence of standard microbiological practices, it is currently 
considered the best measure of biocontainment for M. tuberculosis and other infectious 
substances is. The adoption of a biosafety culture together with a good laboratory practice 
and facilities design is a guarantee to preserve the environment and control risk. 
The design of laboratories, as well as the supportive health and engineering staff faces great 
challenges like: to guarantee the maintenance of long-term infrastructure, to build efficiently 
at a reasonable cost and conscious planning of energy and water, localization of these 
laboratories (If the possibility is offered, this should be discussed with the regional 
development plans in each region). The biocontainment culture in an institution should 
anticipate the management of unexpected situations and for this; the institution must have 
contingency plans and emergency procedures. 
4.1 The contingency plan must include 
Operative procedures for the risk assessment, identification of high risk areas, to identify as 
much specific as possible to the population at risk and their characteristics, emergency 
transportation for the personnel exposed and prioritize this work when an incident occur, 
inventory of resources, suppliers commitment with availability of treatments, availability of 
PPE and properly trained personnel in the proper use and final disposal. Precise actions and 
simulations to verify the effectiveness of the evacuation plan and estimate the possibility of 
natural disaster like earthquakes powerful, storms and flooding, depending on the 
geographic region. (Lindell 1996 and, Young 2004) 
Emergency procedures should include practical protocols, effective and achievable 
depending on the resources of the institution, these biocontainment protocols should 
include all possible events or accidents according with common activities like: ingestion or 
inhalation of potentially infectious material, broken containers and infectious spilled 
substances, breakage of tubes in centrifuges, puncture wounds, cuts and abrasions. 
The police and fire departments should be involved in the development of emergency and 
contingency plans for fire or natural disasters, but they need to take a special training. Since, it 
is impossible to prevent all incidents of this nature, some precautions must be followed. These 
are some examples of what can be done to minimize the possibility of releasing pathogenic 
organism into the environment as the result of a natural disaster: post notices on all incubators, 
refrigerators, freezers and other storage facilities and contents listing persons to be notified in 
case of incident, secure store in culture collections, damage resistant cabinets or containers, 
cabinets or shelving provide for storing books, equipment, chemicals and others that close 
securely with doors, do not store heavy boxes and equipment above bench level. 
5. Disinfection and sterilization 
Understanding the importance of decontamination, cleaning, sterilization and disinfection is 
vital for implementing a laboratory biosafety plan. The descending order of resistance to 
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Disinfection
Reagent Concentration
Time 
exposure
Action Funtion Dificulties 
Phenol 0.4 - 5% 10 minutes
Protein 
denaturation
Efficient 
disinfectants
Irritant, toxic, 
corrosive 
Formal-
dehyde 
5% 10 minutes
Protein 
alkylation 
Efficient 
disinfectants 
Cutaneous 
irritant, 
respiratory 
irritant, eye 
irritant 
Glutaral-
dehyde 
1 - 2% 
20 - 30 
minutes 
Membrane 
disruption 
Efficient 
disinfectants, or 
decontaminating 
surfaces
Toxic, cutaneous 
irritant, eye 
irritant 
Sodium 
hypochlorite 
0.2 - 5%,  
5000 ppm, 
1g/L 
1 - 2 
minutes 
Enzymatic 
inhactivation
Efficient 
disinfectants 
Toxic, corrosive, 
cutaneous 
irritant, 
respiratory 
irritant, eye 
irritant 
Ethyl 
alcohol 
70%, 96% 2 minutes
Protein action, 
membrane 
disruption 
Surface 
disinfectant, 
mycobacterial 
disinfectants
Eye irritant 
Hydrogen 
peroxide 
3 - 10% 5 minutes
Free radicals, 
lipid and 
proteins 
action
Disinfectants 
Corrosive, 
respiratory 
irritant 
Iodophore 
2 - 10 %,  
75 ppm 
 
Iodination and 
oxidation of 
proteins 
Disinfectants 
Cutaneous 
irritant, 
respiratory 
irritant, eye 
irritant, 
corrosive 
Mix 1 : 
Iodine + 
ionophores, 
or ethyl 
alcohol 
variable variable 
Iodination and 
oxidation of 
proteins 
Efficient 
disinfectants 
Cutaneous 
irritant, 
respiratory 
irritant, eye 
irritant, 
corrosive 
Mix 2: 
paraformal
dehyde + 
glutaraldeh
yde or 
formalin 
solutions. 
2- 5% 
10 - 30 
minutes 
Protein 
alkylation, 
membrane 
disruption 
Inactivation 
Toxic,  
cutaneous 
irritant, 
respiratory 
irritant,  
eye irritant 
Table 3. Summarizes the properties of some liquid germicides that are recommended again 
M. tuberculosis. 
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germicidal chemicals is: bacterial spores, Mycobacteria (especially M. tuberculosis), small 
viruses (Non lipid), fungi, vegetative bacteria, and medium size viruses (lipid) (Favero 1998, 
and 2001, and CDC 2003). Each laboratory must evaluate the efficacy of germicides. See 
table 3 (Kunz 1982, Best 1988, 1990, Rubin 1991, Rutala 1991, Sattar 1995, Schwebach 2001, 
and Blackwood 2005). Is essential that manufacturer’s recommended use dilutions are 
followed. 
Sterilization: susceptible to moist heat sterilization at 121°C for 15 minutes at 121 pounds of 
pressure. 
6. Packing and shipping biological materials 
The care and responsibility that one assumes when transporting infected material that 
contains live M. tuberculosis serve to guarantee the biosecurity of this important process. The 
transportation of infected material can occur within the same hospital (from the patient’s 
room to the laboratory) or to an outside location (other institutions, cities, or countries). The 
transport of material infected with M. tuberculosis to areas within a hospital or laboratory 
should be made using resistant containers that can be easily disinfected; the container 
should have a hermetic seal capable of containing infectious substances during accidents, or 
until such time as the substances can be handled in a BSC. Currently, various organizations 
have prepared guidelines that should be used in order to reduce the risk of infection to 
personnel and the environment.  
Current regulations governing the transport of hazardous items include obligatory actions 
that apply to the three parties involved in the process: the recipient (should receive import 
authorization and provide the appropriate documentation); the transporter or operator 
(should use a verification list, accept or reject the items to be transported, provide training, 
adequate documentation and instructions) and the shipper who should comply with 
packaging norms (should classify, identify and package the infected material, place 
markings and labels, document and have emergency plans in place). 
The majority of the guidelines established for the transport of hazardous materials have 
been issued by the following agencies:  
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized United Nations (UN) 
agency with the regulations entitled “Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air” 
- The IATA with regulations entitled “IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 
- The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) with regulations entitled “United States 
Hazardous Material Uniform Safety Act.” 
These regulations are similar with respect to the following guidelines: classification and 
naming of diagnostic specimens and infectious substances; marking and labeling packaging 
material; training and certification of personnel; practical suggestions for classifying 
diagnostic specimens and infectious substances; resources for additional information and 
documentation; and instructions for completing a shipper’s declaration for dangerous 
goods. This can change significantly as a result of investigations or sudden pandemics 
which may necessitate new measures and regulations. 
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IATA requirements and DOT regulations provide minimum requirements for packing and 
shipping diagnostic specimens and infectious substances. These provisions include: 
- Classification and naming of the substances to be shipped: select the appropriate IATA 
packing instructions; in the case of category A material, submit the necessary 
information to complete the shipper’s declaration. The substance or material should be 
classified in one of the nine IATA specified classes (1-explosivos, 2- gases, 3- flammable 
liquids, 4- flammable solids, 5- oxidizing substances and organic peroxides, 6- toxic and 
infectious substances, division 6.1: toxic substances, division 6.2 infectious substances, 
7- radioactive materials, 8- corrosives and 9-miscellaneous dangerous goods) (IATA 
2006). 
- The classification 6.2 must be divided into one of nine IATA specific groups such as: -
category A infectious substances, -category B infectious substances, –exempt human or 
animal specimens, -exempt substances, -patient specimens, -genetically modified 
organisms, -biological products, - infected animals, -medical waste.  
The category A substances are specifically designated as pathogens which can be dangerous 
to both individual and public health. Category A pathogens and substances likely to contain 
category A pathogens must be assigned UN number UN2814 for infectious substances that 
affect humans or UN2900 for infectious substances affecting animals. 
- The selection of package and packing the shipment correctly: after having classified the 
infectious substance, the shipper must officially name the Category A or B material; the 
substances must then be assigned one of the more than 3,000 IATA specified, and 
internationally recognized, UN numbers accompanied by the proper shipping name as 
provided by IATA regulations. This list provides information about 14 items, identified 
in alphabetical order from A to N, for each of the proper shipping names; this data is 
required in order to complete the shipper’s declaration. 
The PI describes the minimum standards for the safe transport of various biological 
materials. Shippers are legally obligated to comply with the regulations. Materials must 
be packaged properly in order to ensure the safety of all personnel who handle the 
package before, during, and after shipment. Clinical laboratories transporting category A 
infectious substances should use PI 602; for category B infectious materials, PI 650 should 
be used. 
The PI 602 used for the packaging of infectious material should comply with the following 
requirements: leakproof and pressure-resistant for the first and second containers; absorbent 
between the first and second containers; list of contents between the second container and 
outer package; rigid outer packaging; positively sealed first container; name, address, and 
telephone number of responsible person on outer package or air waybill; shipper 
declaration for dangerous goods; outer packaging marking and labels; and strict 
manufacturing specifications. See table 4: 
- The outer package should include appropriate markings and labels: labeling is the act of 
placing informational labels or stickers onto the surface of an outer package. The 
shipper is responsible for the proper marking and labeling of the outer shipping 
container. The labels and markings include: 
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Column Information
2814 
A 
United Nations number of the 
proper shipping 
name/description 
B 
Proper shipping 
name/description 
Infectious 
Substance, 
Affecting Humans 
(Liquid) 
Infectious 
Substance, 
Affecting Humans 
(Solid) 
C 
Class or division of dangerous 
good 
6.2 6.2 
D NA 
E 
Hazard label required on the 
outer package 
Infectious 
substance 
Infectious 
substance 
F NA 
G NA 
H NA 
I 
PI to use for passenger and 
cargo aircraft 
602 602 
J 
Maximum allowable amounts 
to be shipped in passenger and 
cargo aircraft 
50 ml 50 g 
K PI to use for cargo aircraft only 602 602 
L 
Maximum allowable amounts 
to be shipped in cargo aircraft 
only 
4 liters 4 kg 
M 
Applicable special provisions 
and exceptions 
A81 A140 A81 A140 
N Emergency response code 11Y 11Y 
Table 4. Shipping requirements for infection substances (M. tuberculosis). 
- Name and direction of the shipper, name, address and telephone number of the 
responsible party, as provided by IATA regulations. The diamond-shaped infectious 
substances label should be used when shipping contaminated material, accompanied by 
a label which shows the proper shipping name, UN number, and quantity of the 
substances; the package orientation label must also be included and placed on opposite 
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sides of the entire package. Additional markings may be included as required. The 
“cargo aircraft only” label indicates that the package may be shipped only in cargo, and 
not on passenger, aircraft; this label is used if the infectious substance is over 50 ml but 
less than 4 liters per the outer package being shipped. The “overpack” markings 
indicate that an overpack is used and that inner packages comply with the regulations. 
Packaging that meets UN specifications is marked by a “UN” inside of a circle and a 
series of letters and numbers which indicate the type of package, class of goods the 
package is designed to carry, the manufacturer, authorizing agency, and manufacturing 
date. The designation “Class 6.2” indicates that the container is approved for shipping 
infectious substances.(see figure 3) 
 
Fig. 3. Biomedical packaging for infectious substances, marking and labeling packages 
established by agencies governing transportation of dangerous goods. 
- The relevant document: the preparation and delivery of a shipper’s declaration is 
necessary in order to formalize a legal contract; this document is required for category 
A substances; however, it is not required for category B material. These documents 
should be completed in their entirety. 
- Training for personnel: competent authorities such as the CDC offer training in the 
transport of infectious substances to laboratory personnel, members of biosecurity 
committees, and professionals in different areas.(IATA 2006, U.S. Department of 
Transportation 2004, and 2006, and WHO 2004, and 2005) Additional information 
concerning these regulations is available at http://www.iata.org or 
http://www.who.int/crs/resourceces/publications/biosafety/WWHO_CDS-EPR-
2007_2/en/index.html  
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7. Conclusion 
Is buying biosafety and biocontainment the best option?  
The growing number of professionals infected by M. tuberculosis, many of whom have died 
due to this without knowing for certain the source of infection or exposure (whether the 
community or their workplace), and the dramatic figures of deaths caused by TB around the 
world among people infected or not with HIV confront us with a question to which we have 
no answer: Did the person get infected in a hospital waiting room, in an international flight? 
When did it happen? We don’t know, and that is why it is so important to enhance 
community awareness on these issues.  
Risk assessment and the adoption of biosecurity and biocontainment measures with the 
participation of academic institutions, scientists, designers and community at large 
represent paying the right price and obtaining the expected impact. 
8. Self evaluation 
Self evaluation: 
1. What is M. tuberculosis? 
a. Fungi 
b. Bacteria 
c. Virus 
d. Other 
2. Which is M. tuberculosis mode of transmission?  
a. Airborne 
b. Sexual contact 
c. Vertical transmission. 
3. How is M. tuberculosis spread person to person? 
a. Inhalation of infectious aerosol or infected droplets 
b. Water 
c. Foods 
d. Clothes  
4. What is a N95? 
a. Respirator 
b. Surgical mask 
c. HEPA filter 
5. Is the infectious dose of M. tuberculosis less than 1000 bacilli by inhalation route in 
humans? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Is unknown 
6. What are the tests for TB infection? 
a. PPD or IGRAs 
b. BCG 
c. PPE 
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7. What is the meaning of microorganisms RG 3  
a. no or low individual and community risk 
b. high individual and community risk 
c. high individual risk, low community risk 
d. moderate individual risk, low community risk 
8. What IATA category is M. tuberculosis? 
a. Category A 
b. Category B 
c. Category PI 
9. The sterilization conditions for M. tuberculosis included? 
a. 121°C for 15 minutes at 121 pounds of pressure 
b. 121°C for 90 minutes at 140 pounds of pressure 
c. 15°C for 15 minutes at 121 pounds of pressure 
d. Unknown 
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